Toward a Question of “Communicative Turn” in Contemporary Education

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Annotation: The article deals with the marking and conceptualization of those theoretical means which, according to the authors, may describe (and put into practice) the communicative turn in contemporary education. The concepts introduced here do not constitute a strict system, but are related at the level of “family similarity.” The communicative turn of education is described as the transformation in the constituents of a pedagogic process: in perception and in the rules of participants’ activity. This transformation is regarded as change in: 1) the ontology of education which is now considered in terms of communicative production; 2) the epistemology of education which placed the actor within practices of the communal production of meanings; 3) the technologies of education where the aspect of communicative action is emphasized.

Key words: local sociocentrism, radical situationalism, constitutive expectations, communicative resource, communicative act, educational practice.

Introduction

A number of analysts describe the changes in science and culture that became apparent in the second half of the 20th century by the metaphor of “communicative turn.” One of the modern French thinkers S. Moscovici wrote about these new circumstances that “after World War II it became impossible to build a society based on labour and belief as it was earlier, because of the increased role of communication processes and the production of knowledge” (Moscovici, 1995, p. 9). This “increase” may be interpreted as a heightening of the amount of knowledge and communication production in all spheres of social life, including education. In the present text this phenomenal observation is reformulated in the following way: a word, an utterance, a text, an interpretation are all the acts through which this or that reality, as a form of human presence in the world, is creates, confirmed, or deconstructed. This principle will be a point of departure for further conceptualizations.

The word “education,” as it is used in the article, refers mainly to a higher education, but only as one of fields of its usage. The term “education” first of all serves to solve the problem of specific diversification of educational reality. That is, it’s application have to create a possibility for marginalizing traditional pedagogical perception of education as well as for building other equally valued pedagogical forms.

But one form of traditional perception of education we would like to exclude from our discussion from the beginning. We mean an interpretation of education as professional training and its derivatives: training of specialists in natural sciences and humanities, social demand for certain professions, models of graduates oriented towards the rapidly changing labour market, etc. Hence, education as stuff training is not discussed in the article.

The authors of the article sought to create conditions for intensive interaction of mutually oriented utterances (the utterances of the article’s authors and those of readers) with the help of recontextualization, e.g. specifically organized communicative experimentation. We wanted a new understanding of education to be an effect of interlocutors’ participation in this specific communicative enterprise. Thus organized “participative” procedure is viewed in the text not only as a textual mechanism but also as an educational practice that we name “communicative education.” It must be emphasized that we speak here not about teaching of communicative disciplines, but about approach to education functioning, application of which will produce the reordering of all current educational relations as well as forms of their scientific description.

Let us illustrate this new understanding of education by the example of the distinction between scientific notions such as “education” and “research.” Within the conceptual framework of the article this distinction loses its epistemic status and turns into a productive act. Traditional didactic theory distinguish “education” and “research.” But this distinguishing has evident practical consequences: a) objectivization of the specific interpretation of “education” and b) transcendentalization of the researcher’s role. The acts of distinguishing and of “objectivity” and “transcendence” production may be viewed as the practices which provide for cultural continuity and unification. In the act of distinguishing the object and its “counter-agent,” i.e. an investigator, take a certain shape, which allow to interpret them as transsituational and to use as a constant principle of activity and thinking. As opposed to this, we try to examine (exclusively in terms of our objectives) educational and research relations as identical ones. The procedure of distinguishing between these relations will bring the person who accomplishes the distinguishing back to the traditional research and pedagogical situation. Thus, one of the aims of the text is to create the area where the pedagogical and research positions can meet, to reveal those situations where both attitudes can be realized not only simultaneously, but as essential preconditions of each other.

All the above mentioned can be said about another categorial pair: “education” and “communication.” Within the article’s conceptual perspective education is considered as a complicated network of communicative practices that confirm and maintain certain cultural forms: situations, types of knowledge, and ways of understanding. This implies primarily a differentiation of traditional educational — and, broadly
speaking, social — relationships, and such differentiation realized within communicative practices or “language games” (Wittgenstein) already existing in education. The study of how communicative relations constitute (deconstruct) the very texture of education, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how educational experience transforms different forms of communication helps us to reveal in what way, due to what discursive and other systems, and under what circumstances specific cultural phenomena and schemes of the culture genesis can emerge and function. From this point of view, the interpenetration of education and communication (through which education becomes communicative and communication becomes educational [Moeglin, 1994]) leads to appearance of the particular picture of education, of the description that constitute a local semio-semantic area with its own pragmatics and a special connection with the cultural context.

The main point of communicative turn is the addressing to communication as a resource of our thinking and activity. This cultural transformation is determined at least by three propositions that are principle conditions of the communicative turn: ontological (when all cultural objects are considered as communicative effects; moreover, the reality, as far as it is regarded as the result of the socio-cultural production, is also communicatively interpreted), epistemological (when the main accent is put on the role of communication in the generation of meanings, as well as in the process of working out schemes of interpretation of the surroundings, of other people, and of oneself), and technological (when the mechanism of communication is spread on all the kinds of social reproduction and transformations as its medium). These three aspects constitute a grid of specific communicative practice, the subject matter of which comprises communicative acts. The reality of communication in this case is not an analytical reconstruction, which allows to shape some activity (e.g. educational), but a significant condition and principle of the activity. Researcher distinguish usually between two types of questions: analytical ones (“What is communication?”), which are the prerogative of theorists, and applied ones (“How to organize communication on the basis of these or those theoretical dispositions?”), which teachers and other non-theorists supposed to ask. This distinction makes it possible to built a system of conceptual means that allow examining a certain activity in more detail. A communication analyst, who realizes that we are always engaged in communication, puts instead practical questions (“In which kind of communication do we participate?,” “Which form of communication should we use?”). From the communication analyst’s point of view, the answers to a practical questions, as opposed to the answers to a theoretical questions, are connected with the movement in a certain situations and with the transformation of the “perceptual” system, rather than with the adoption of a certain analytical approach towards the field under examination.
Thus, communicative turn in education is constituted by a range of transformations in educational ontology, epistemology, and technology. As a result, we cannot speak about any communicative conception of education. Such kind of a turn drive us to find and use diverse forms of communicative acts without any predetermined model of education. Therefore, communication as a form of educational interaction becomes ever-problematic and should always function as an object of actual pedagogical definition.

According to this, the aim of present article is to describe some changes in educational practices inspired by the communicative turn. It requires an analysis of the following questions: What is the order of communicative acts which helps to specify the communicative educational practice? What are the conditions of the transformation of a pedagogic purpose that helps to find the resource of communicativeness in educational practices? What kind of cultural efficiency does this kind of communicative education carry with itself?

In the first part of the paper we will describe such constituents of the communicative method as sociocentrism, radical situationism, and discursive mediation. The second part is concerned with the elements of educational pragmatics of the communicative acts (the construction of a communicative object, e.g. background expectancies) and the means of dealing with these elements. In the third, final, part we will present the problem of modification of the individual’s attitude towards himself within the field of communicative educational action and research.

Constituents of Communicative Education: Sociocentrism

First of all, the emphasis on communicativeness presumes certain perceptive attitude, which one may call sociocentricity. Sociocentricity is a specific view on the actor’s perspective which implies tracing the origins of actor’s practice back to the interpersonal interaction and to the mediation through the forms of the social whole. This approach states that “the terms and forms by which we achieve understanding of the world and ourselves are social artifacts, products of historically and culturally situated interchanges among people” (Gergen, 1999, p. 49). In this sense, communicative approach uses the results of social psychology which studies either phenomena derived from group interaction or very collective forms, their genesis and dynamics. However, communicative approach does not borrow the subject matter of social psychology in the form of reality of the objective scientific research and description, but views it practically, as a means or effects of communicative production which includes dynamic positioning of interaction participants within concrete discursive practices.

In sociocentrical perspective individual loses his or here status as a source of action and thinking. Individual becomes a position in social
relations, communicative acts, or situated speech practice. Sociocentrism shifts away from individualism and mentalism, viewing this approaches at the same time as communicative practices which maintains and supports the rhetoric of individualization in the community. Such rhetoric makes sense owing to the fact that “scholarly accounts of individual minds play a powerful role in justifying and sustaining patterns of cultural life” (Gergen, 1999, p. 211). The main question here is not “Who speaks?” (or “Who replies?”), but “What are the communicative origins of given utterance?”

The questions like these one represent a radical shift in our understanding and in our type of rationality. The subjective act of expression (which forms a principle of semantic order) is displaced by communicative means of meaning production. In practice it means to follow the imperative: meanings originate not in our minds, but in communication. Habermas underlines that on the linguistic level we have dichotomy: “The speakers are either the masters or the slaves of their language systems” (Habermas, 2003, p. 327). This means that various descriptions of communicative forms, based on the ontology of individual, exclude sociocentrical perspective. In the communicative theory this dilemma is often presented as existence of two strategic orientations. The first originates in the romantic tradition and is connected with such scientists as Wilhelm von Humboldt, Potiehnia, Buhler, etc. These scholars considered language as “a dynamic phenomenon constantly evolving as a result of the creative energy of the speaker” (Gudkov, 2003, p. 18). The other orientation has its roots in structuralism (Ferdinand de Saussure, Jakobson, etc.), which analyses language as “the creation of certain constructions from discretely fixed units according to given models” (Gudkov, 2003, p. 18).

The sociocentric interpretation of communication as we understand it shares the basic intention of structuralism to view language not as a possession of individual but as something where individual finds himself or herself. At the same time, we must limit the universality of linguistic pressure. The attention must be given not to the linguistic (grammatical) forms, but to the practical context of their construction and usage. In other words, we are interested in an individual act insofar as it constitutes a part of “interaction as a whole” (Goffman, 2000, p. 112).

Sociocentricty allow us to view social forms (e.g. language) as lacking any objective substantiality, though their reification (for instance, as social institutions) may resemble destiny or fate. Since the communicative approach reveals the source of any forms, including institutional ones, sociality itself begins to break into various qualities and states. At the same time the possibility of social transformations begins to be viewed as directly connected with structural changes in communicative processes. According to this perspective, sociality is locally produced phenomenon circumscribed by the chosen communicative strategy, which, in turn, serves to coordinate numerous acts within a particular field of
meanings. Sociality needs to be practically confirmed and adopted, and therefore it can be legitimated only in local situation, i.e. sociality is immanent to communication. The transformation of sociality is the transformation within communicative order which makes it possible for social practices to be redefined and for new social relations to be constructed.

Such a sociocentric interpretation of communicative practices guarantees the shift of analytical attention from the circumstances, that motivate individuals’ actions, to the individuals’ joint communicative efforts and its efficacy, embodied in certain forms of interaction. Here priority is given not to the content, but to the form of communication. The mechanism of such a method was defined by Vygotsky. He applied this method to art practices: “From the form of a work of art through the functional analysis of its elements and structure to the reconstruction of the aesthetic reaction and disclosure of its general laws” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 39).

We have to make here some clarification, which will help us to point more precisely the differences between our approach and “individualistic perspective” and also to underline one feature of sociocentric view: its “locality.” A great number, if not all, of individualistic interpretations emphasize in educational transformations a moment of individual effort, their deducibility from motivational, volitional, and mental qualities of actors. For example, pedagogic innovators, close to the mentalistic approach, relied in their practices of educational transformations on the increasing of the level of cognitive complexity among students. Their innovative practices were aimed to raise reflexivity and critical thinking in individuals and groups. Naturally, the subject matter of the reformers’ activity was a mental world (no matter in what language it was described) of students. This attitude had two consequences. The first is concerned with “reflexive sublimation,” an endless process of reobjectivization of one’s “inner world.” The other deals with self-fixation, self-isolation, and apologetics of a lonely self-sufficient individual detached from social relations. We can see that such practices view reflection as a propriety of individual’s consciousness and hence sustain the very tradition they want to overcome. They establish subject-oriented strategies of the production of semantic orders as a cultural dominant.

From the sociocentric point of view on utterances innovations in education imply actions directed towards social situations, conditions, contexts, rules, and forms of communication stabilization, because these aspects seem to have structures which produce various forms of subjectivity, not vice versa. Here situation is the most significant category. We must choose as “objects under study” different situational variables: constitutive expectancies of participants, constructed forms of subjectivity, used discursive strategies, ways of rhetorical achievement of “objective facts,” etc. The problem is not discern what is initial—motivation of the
participants or circumstances that cause a certain kind of motivation. For a communicatively oriented analyst both opinions are discursive constructions that awake specific meanings and phenomena.

Since we place “situation” in the center of our approach to communicative practice, it is necessary to outline the “perceptual transformation” that makes of “situation” a separate object of research and practice.

**Constituents of Communicative Education: Radical Situationalism**

First of all it is necessary to admit that communicative approach chooses a temporal boundaries as a prime subject of situation analysis. However, time here is not absolute constant; the unity of time breaks apart. Each situation has its own temporal structure connected with practice realized within it. The category of situation underlines the importance of locality, limiting the influence of historicism understood as based on idea of “penetrating” some past or future tendencies into the present and their determining of actual factuality. But this does not mean rejection of any historical or futurological statements. The issue is the ongoing communicative arrangement of “past” or “future” discursive events which are viewed as a communicative resource, used by the participants of the interaction to determine situation, to stabilize it or to make it dynamic. Temporal dimensions are understood as constituents of the actual landscape of communicative actions that make communication effects more intelligible. Due to such redefinition of temporal coordinates any communicative act becomes a part of the whole communicative field. K. Lewin, one of the developers of field theory in psychology and social sciences, formulates its key thesis in the following way: “According to the field theory any type of behaviour depends on the entire field, including the temporal perspective at given time, but it does not depend on any past or future field and its temporal perspective” (Lewin, 2000, p. 74). The temporal perspective reveals itself within a communicative act and is determined by the functional characteristics of latter. These characteristics in their turn are derivatives of relationship between given communicative act and whole communicative situation.

The “redefinition” of temporal perspective mentioned above open also a possibility to make a transition to “radical situationalism” in understanding of communicative practices. The origins of this approach can be traced back to the discussions between representatives of universalism (who believe in the existence of extratemporal and extracultural human essence) and their opponents — followers of the socio-cultural approach. In psychology, for instance, the last have always sought to “define mental processes of a human being through their interrelation with cultural, historical, and institutional settings” (Verch, 1996, p. 15).
In humanities the influence of situational variables (environment, life context, socio-cultural realities) have never been rejected. But their use as an explanatory principle, as a very essence of the research subject, by Russian scholars (psychologists, in particular) has just begun (Grishina, 2001, pp. 6-7). This is surprising, since a number of fundamental methodological principles of situationalism were formulated by L.S. Vygotsky. A.R. Luria expressed the credo of situationalism in such a way, appreciating Vygotsky’s contribution to psychology: “…to realize the essence of higher mental processes of a human being it is necessary to go beyond a human body and search the roots of these complex processes in social conditions of life, in communication between a child and adult, in objective reality of things, tools, language, formed as a result of social history — i.e. in assimilation of historically accumulated experience of humankind” (Luria, 1971, p. 37). As we can see, the term ‘situation’ is used here in a broad sense and is understood as the “storehouse” for a large number of cultural concepts and social relations of oversituational character.

Such kind of situationalistic approach is concerned with broad cultural connections and relations which mediate the inner world of person. Consequently, situational changes are measured not by shifts in actual interchanges, but by the large-scale cultural transformations. In this case “situation” is handled as sociocultural and historical context. The investigation into the historical development of cognitive processes, undertaken by Luria in remote villages of Uzbekistan, is the best example of such approach. This work had shown to the followers of socio-cultural school in psychology that all fundamental mental processes depend on social and historical conditions of life. Luria writes about this dependence in the following way: “In spite of the fact that ancient culture of Uzbekistan left the valuable scientific, art, and architectural artifacts, the masses lived by the centuries in conditions of poor economic, illiteracy, and under a great influence of Islam” (Luria, 1974, p. 3). This perspective portrays the mental world of Uzbek shepherds as a local product, a projection of broader social relations.

Radical situationalism, unlike sociocultural situationalism, operates at microsocial level. Sociocultural dependencies are bracketed and replaced by ongoing communication dependencies. For example, the results of the investigations carried out by Luria in Uzbekistan may be understood not so much as an evidence of the influence of historical and social environment on natives, as a result of microsocial research situations, where both experimentalists and subjects were participants. In this case the concept of “situation” should be used not only as a gnoseological (analytical) category, but as an ontological one. It is supposed that actors behave according to their practical understandings, or definitions, of situation. Here we can apply a Thomas’ theorem: “If situation supposed to be real, then it is real in its consequences” (cited in Goffman, 2003, p. 61). Situation is
principally a non-verbal context which gives a meaning to everything that is going on at the moment. This does not mean that the context cannot be conceptualized by the interaction participants. The boundaries of situation are the grounds for basic expectancies, forms of subjectivity, psychological states and so on. Definition of situation do not result from the constitutive activity of individual consciousness, even if it has a social origin. The situation is the effect of many coordinated actions, where each seek to establish its description. Thus, it is possible to say that definition of communicative situation represents a practical construction, not a reflexive interpretation. Or, better, in such definition participants achieve the unity of practice and interpretation as a means of actual communication production. Here we must make the main accent on a linguistic character of situation definition. Of course, we do not mean that any action should be reduced to language. Rather, language is understood as a mediator which, according to Vygotsky, changes the process it mediates. The principal moment here is not language itself (with its syntactic, semantic, and other features, that play a significant role, of course), but the way language is used, the functions it accomplishes, forms of its “practizing.” Language “practizing”, however, consists not only in words usage. Pragmatic view on language redefines its nature and place in communicative activity. Let us try to indicate the direction of this redefinition.

Constituents of the Communicative Education: Discursive Mediation

We are not going to reveal the whole range of roles and functions of language in communicative practices. We will emphasize only one aspect significant for our discussion: way of discourse functioning as it viewed within discursive psychology which “explore how particular constructions of self and others are used to stabilize and make factual seeming, particular versions of events in the world which themselves contribute to the organization of current activities” (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 129). It is necessary to note that the key characteristic of language that provides it with peculiar status is its reflexivity. “Reflexivity… refers to the fact that talk has the property of being both about actions, events, and situations, and at the same time part of those things” (Potter, Wetherell, 1987, p. 182). The object of discourse is those circumstances which are mediated by discourse itself and which dependent on how they are constructed within discourse. Due to such characteristic, discourse becomes a very important instrument of communicative practices, of producing social contexts which are “not independent of utterances. All these contexts are the results of utterances” (Gilbert, Malkay, 1987, p. 59). Separate discursive acts, which simultaneously describe actual communicative situation and are subordinated to it, make communication self-referent. This fact allow us to “leave behind” two traditional poles of language analysis: objective circumstances and subjective traits. Communication that contextualizes and
is contextualized by discourse practices may be understood in this case as non-fixed and non-reducible tool of joint construction. In the field of communicative practice language, freed from “outer” references (cause any reference turns to be internal communicative reference), plays a role of the differential of any practice, and therefore it should be reinterpreted as a kind of activity. This means that communicative practice is primarily an order of differentiation (of meanings, objects, conceptual categories, subjectivities, ways of things handling, meanings, etc.) which is regulated by rules and forms of relationships specific to concrete communication. The way of language use, which realizes a certain type of discourse, is a tool of differentiating sociality within communicative practice.

However, how the statement that communicative act aims at differentiation and that communicative practice accomplish a series of differentiations should be understood? As an example let us cite the following statement: “A text must contain means of its comprehension.” Obviously, this statement may be contextualized in a different ways, we can put it in such networks of connections with other statements, which will refer to various types of discourse and therefore to various communicative practices. Thus, we may contextualize the phrase by considering “means” as a “apparatus of concepts and categories.” In this case “means” should be given or worked out in the form of categories, concepts, schemes, models, etc., which then will be introduced and used in communication. And this will fit a certain type of educational practice. On the pedagogical level this will mean that communicative acts of a teacher should be directed towards giving, demonstrating, transferring, processing, etc. such a “means.” In this regard a pedagogic action viewed as an act which serves to fill the situational deficit of language. We can also put the statement “A text must contain means of its comprehension” in another system of interrelations, following Vygotsky’s idea of mediation. Vygotsky said that it is important not only that sign mediates, but how it mediates, i.e. the way of sign usage. As far as communication is concerned, the question of “means” is the question of language use. As a result, phrase “A text must contain means of its comprehension” acquires another meaning. If “means” are considered to be a ways of utterances construction, a ways of handling language, of establishing relations between different expressions, then there is no need to refer to anything outside, communication is its own resource. The building of such discourse interrelations implies a corresponding educational practice. For example, a pedagogic act may be a kind of “breaching” action, i.e. action that causes error, discrepancy in the system of existing understandings and expectations (experiential schemes and categorizations). This act can be a paradoxical way of revealing a differences in interpretations. Thus, the statement saying that language plays a role of a differential of any practice, any actions means that communication should be considered as being constituted through both agreement and disagreement, contradictions. Communication is connected
with both the order of coordination and order of differentiation. The question is what is the principle of pedagogic action, how the educational transformations can be accomplished: through transference of a missing tools of experience categorization or through problematization of current means of schematization and categorization. In each case educational practice will refer to different types of communicative practice with different meanings, concepts, objects, on the one hand, and different relations to others and self, on the other. In this regard in concrete situation communication and means of communication inseparable, though we can separate them analytically.

In sum, communicative turn in education leads us to emphasize and to make a prior object of attention a functional characteristics of language, ways of language use. Wittgenstein formulates a communicative maxim of language studies in the following way: “...to examine linguistic phenomena in the primitive forms of its use, where one can clearly see the function of words and the way they are used” (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 82). In other words, educational situation should be built in such a way to make from the forms of language a contents of learning activity.

Apart from considering language through the lenses of its usage and as a tool of actual situation construction, communicative approach redefines the status of interpretation in social cognition, because traditionally language analysis found its ground in interpretation practices. Common sense as well as scientific research logic require to separate the object of utterance and the utterance itself. It is derived from this principle that there are only different interpretations of one and the same things. This interpretations, rather then being in conflict with each other, just describe different sides of reality (of course, there may be true and wrong interpretations). Differences between them are explained by differences in observers’ positions. Following this point of view, the conflict of interpretations is always an inessential contradiction, misunderstanding emerging because of ambiguity, insufficient clarity of the observation procedure. We can and should overcome such conflicts by localizing a position of observer towards reality, his attitudes and perceptual apparatus. This postulate lies behind many contemporary practices of learning to think critically.

The communicative approach we have adopted goes from the inseparable unity of reality and interpretation, judgment and an object of judgment, understanding and activity. Realities, senses, and meanings appear and disappear as a result of ongoing processes of interpretation and reinterpretation. To interpret means to construct. Objects of judgment (as well as such usual for humanities objects as personality, culture, meaning, communication) belong to interpretative field. It is evident from this presupposition that the conflict of interpretations refers not to differences in individual dispositions, but to the “nature” of culture. This conflict is an inevitable characteristic of our presence in the world. According to P.
Ricoeur, “polysemy is not a divergent phenomenon… polysemy… belongs to the sphere where any language is formed and functions” (Ricoeur, 2002, p. 122).

Pragmatics of Communicative Education: Background Expectancies

The fact that it becomes possible today to talk about the communicative turn regarding education is not a result of changes that took place in education, rather these changes themselves are the consequences of established new rules of understanding and defining the educational “reality,” i.e. new practices of speaking or, in Foucault terms, new “cognitive network… which finally leads to the changes of the original point of view” (Foucault, 2002, p. 98). This does no mean that reality is opposed to its description, there is no any dichotomy between autonomous individual and independent world. Changes in reality are changes in a way it is interpreted, and they are rooted in a certain socio-cultural collective practice, rather then in individual consciousness. In this sense communication should be studied as a production of collective situations within which individuals and knowledge are located. The understanding of communication will depend to a great extent on how certain forms of knowledge and understanding we interact with, have relations with, transform and thus create are produced.

Communicative analysis helps to show that both a student and a teacher start communication having the common set of assumptions. They need to share a set of apriori coordinates if they want to communicate. The set of background assumptions shapes the conditions of communication and utterances interpretation as well as possible intelligibility of the utterances. Background assumptions constitute mutual expectations, in accordance with which the subject of education will act. They orient individual, in particular, towards the fact that qualities of his or her educational actions characteristic not only of his or her own activity, but also of others’ actions, members of the same community (the community of teachers and students). The student expects from the teacher that the latter will provide him with a certain material (in the form of a lecture, for example), will set up the aim of studying this material (or, why it should be used in actual learning situation or in future professional life), will show the ways of interpreting this material, etc. The student also expects that as he expects this actions from teacher the teacher expects certain actions from him or her, e.g. to understand the material (according to the given scheme of interpretation), to learn it, to be able to demonstrate a success in its understanding (in nearest future — on exam, in distant future — in professional life). Finally, as student expects this expectancies from teacher, the teacher expects that student will expect from teacher such expectancies.
The teacher acts as “one supposed to know,” while the student — as “one supposed to believe.” (“The subject supposed to know” and “the subject supposed to believe” are the terms of R. Mocnik; but he used them in a different context [Mocnik, 2001].) The teacher acts as an expert in current educational situation. His knowledge comprises not only the material that should be “transferred,” but also the technique of how to transfer this material and, in a broader sense, how to organize the ongoing learning situation and educational communication in general. One of background assumptions of both the student and teacher is that communication should be organized be the teacher. Such organization implies in particular the existence of “clear plan” according to which it is possible to value the “right” and “wrong” things. To “believe” for the student means not only to believe in contents of the material given by the teacher or another expert (for example, the author of the scholarly text), but also to believe that teacher knows. The belief that teacher knows is one of the preconditions influencing the intelligibility of students’ utterances. The intelligibility of communicative situation is determined not by grammatically proper talk. According to A. Giddens, “the meaning in communicative acts, as it is produced by everyday actors, cannot be grasped mere in linguistic terms, it cannot be interpreted in terms of formal logic either, as formal logic pays no attention to the contextual dependency” (Giddens, 2002, p. 291). Rather, the primary and necessary condition of intelligibility is the coincidence of expectancies (in particular, that communicative situation will be organizes by the teacher, that its “structure” (“plan,” “main point”) and “general direction” will be disclosed by the teacher, that the teacher will act as “the subject supposed to know” and the student will take a position of “the subject supposed to believe that teacher supposed to know,” etc.).

The expectations we described are rather typical for existing educational practices as well as for alternative educational projects. We have here a dominating educational attitude those aim is to guarantee the “alternation.” A historical prototype of alternation is a “religious conversion” (Berger, Lukman, 1995, p. 255). According to this point of view, alternational values are shared by teachers and researchers in education as taken for granted.

**Strategies of Research and Pedagogical Action**

Traditionally, communication is considered to be in service position within education, communication serves different pedagogic purposes. The main problem in this case is how to organize communication in concrete settings according to desirable pedagogical aim. On the other hand, we can reverse the opposition and place communication “above” education, for instance, if we view education as a practice of communication skills formation or communicative competence training. In this case we meet the inevitable
problem of inconsistent definitions of communication in different approaches. The question here is how to achieve a common understanding between different scholars, in other words the problem of communication is formulated as a necessity to find a common language to describe it. Communication is therefore divided into the area of thematic conceptualizations and the area of instrumental applications. Hence, there are supposed to be a basic gap between practice and theory of communication. This discrepancy is necessary if we want to establish communicative studies as a separate discipline. Demarcation like this legitimates a teaching of communication as a special subject because we begin to view everyday communicative experience as insufficient, as a source of errors and as required to be overcome with the help of “truly scientific” concepts.

Such problematization of communication and education, when the former is interpreted as a subfield of the latter and form a separate discipline which serves to train the future specialist to be a “competent communicator,” helps to resolve an important problem concerning professionalism and the transformation of social relations. However, from our point of view this statement reveals its irrelevance. Introducing communication into education as a scientific discipline, researcher or educator sustain the gap between education and everyday experience and creates a new gap between education and research. Since ancient times the ideal of replacing everyday knowledge with scientific knowledge has been the basis of many pedagogical projects. However, by his “demonstrations” H. Garfinkel showed that everyday methods of interpretation and social construction of reality are as complicated as their scientific rational analogues and often used a basis for scientific reconstructions of peoples’ actions (Garfinkel, 1967). That is why education itself should be considered as a practice with its own “everydayness.” It would be interesting to study a “naturalness” of educational communication which is characterized by a set of background expectancies concerning how educational events should occur. But for this purpose we have to reject the positivistic research model that is based on the opposition of the research subject and research object. The impossibility to distinguish between everyday and scientific methods destroys the border between researcher and subject.

It was pointed at the beginning of the article that we will try to find a points where research and pedagogic positions meet or even coincide. We can approximate to this aim if will understand a system of pedagogic acts as directed towards the order of the communicative interaction within given educational situation. Combining educational and research practices means that a pedagogic action takes the form of a breaching act and will orient itself first of all towards the processes of educational communication construction: towards explication and work with the system of mutual expectancies (of the teacher and student), experimentation with taken for
granted, problematization of the obvious character of everyday categorizations and schematizations, revealing possibilities of a new forms of subjectivity (educational subjectivity) and new forms of knowledge, finding out the limits of experience. Thus, one of the aims of such actions is to form polycontextual sensitivity that presupposes a limitation of the universalistic attitude which makes from personal experience (and personal opinion is its quintessence) or scientific knowledge a universal principle of education. The work with taken for granted closely connected with reflexion of the one’s own strategies of contextualization that allow to find other equally possible and valuable ways of contextualization. In this case the purpose of education is to form a situation where experience of self-relation can appear. This may also change such an act as pedagogic evaluation. Teacher now do not give feedback, do not formulate an expert opinion about student’s knowledge and skills. Teacher’s comments may show what position he occupy in communication and how this position functions. The main question here is to find how educational communication may be differentiated through the special self-relation of its participants.

Combining communication and education as an objects of research changes the very status and structure of our research practices. In this case, communication is, to use terms proposed by M. Foucault, “the differentiating epistemological figure” influencing the way of setting up a research problem and type of research discourse, rather then a scientific notion which determines the research object (Foucault, 2002, p. 86). It is possible to say that communication “gives birth” to specific methods and discourses of its study and description, but it is function as a mobile context, intuitive image. Communication research is different from “revealing something in reality.” Its reminds rather “deviation in practice.”

It is possible to point out two main research strategies of establishing correlation between “education” and “communication” in educational science and practice. The first strategy may be presented as “phenomenal.” Here to the phenomena of “education” and “communication” are attributed independent structures that precede the act of their study and that can be found and revealed. The “equipped” observer only fixes their existence and dynamics. The other strategy — “constructive” — makes observer to view his or her position as a part of the studied reality (of course, it’s difficult to discern in this case something like “studied reality”). Research becomes a communicative practice where several parties are involved, and they construct certain relations that finally result in a more or less explicit product. Roughly speaking, the key link of the first type of the research is “phenomenal reflexion” which constitutes the research “phenomenon”. The core of the second type of the research is self-reflexion which remove the “self” of researcher. The instrument of the first strategy is a special method applied to independent reality. In the second strategy main instrument is a researcher himself or herself. “Researcher” transform his or her own
identity in the process of research, and this is a precondition and tool of specific reality production, not an effect or result like in the first case.

Self-transformation of the researcher is not a volitional or intellectual act. Self-transformation is a special type of the communicative performance that produce new forms of subjectivity or “modes of existence” (Foucault). And this kind of processes constitute education. From this point of view communicative education becomes the central moment of cultural life. Experimentation with new realities, new identities, new communities which is the essence of communicatively interpreted education broadens the field of resources available to cultural construction.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we would like to answer the question put in the introductory part of the article: “What kind of cultural efficiency does this kind of communicative education carry with itself?” In general, such a transformation opens several perspectives.

In the introductory part of the article we limited the use professional training as a cenral principle of education. Now this requirement may be supplemented with one more imperative: we must free education from such subject-oriented connotations as self-fulfillment, self-actualization, and self-development, which lay in the ground of many pedagogical projects. The aim of this “limitations” is to broaden a very strict field of views on education so that it would be possible to include here previously marginalized or excluded interpretations. The less alternatives we have in education, the less resources of constructing meaningful relations we have in society and culture.

Today we have to find our ways in principally multicultural situation. What must be a strategy of the pedagogic conduct in the situation where there various cultural forms and ways of the interaction are meet? The orientation to multiculturality requires from education to become the place where new forms of relations with knowledge, others, and self are not only reproduced, but generated. We can trace such a change in attitudes with the help of the example of “identity” transformation in education.

The traditional description of identity in education is connected, as a rule, with the necessity of self-determination (professional self-determination in accordance with a certain image of a professional and personal self-determination in accordance with a certain image of the “self”) and of taking a certain position in the hierarchy through the “identification.” This view deeply rooted in mentalistic tradition where “self” considered to be a relatively stable structure. Here the origin of traditional educational discussions concerning the subject of the activity, objects, aims, personal meanings, skills, etc.

However, in modern polycultural situation statements proclaiming that the subject has a fixed position (hence, the fixed image of the “self”) are
meaningless. In this conditions the idea of “mobile” identity, which is associated with social mobility, is becoming more topical and significant (Berger, Luckmann, 1980). Identity now associated with changes and permanent transformations. Education must become the place where such experience should form. The critical place in such education must takes a construction and deconstruction of different “identity” practices by participants of educational communication. There is no one “true” identity which would help to survive in contemporary world. We must gain the experience of “practizing the self” in education, experience of viewing our identity as a local effect of specific “technology of the self” (Foucault).

Certainly, we do not have ready-made answers to the questions mentioned above. But one thing is clear: we must now only search for such answers, we also must make from such search a core of possible educational practice.

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